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Sustainability  is  defined as  a  requirement  of  our  generation to  manage the
resource base such that the average  quality of life that woe  ensure ourselves can potentially
be shared by all future generations.  The notion 'quality  of life' is meant  to  include
everything that  influences  the  situation in which people live.  Hence, the notion
includes much more than  material consumption.  Extending the  requirement of
sustainability to  future  generations yields the  following  definition of  sustainable
development: Development  is sustainable if it involves a non-decreasing  average quality
Of life.  Furthermore, it  places the following  requirement on our generation:  Our
generation's management  of the resource base is sustainable  if it constitutes the first part
of a feasible  sustainable development. This is the interpretation  of sustainability which
has been  suggested  in a number  of references.
Sustainability  in the above sense is a natural requirement  of intergenerational
justice because  it can be shown  that under given conditions  that if development  is not
sustainable  there exists another development  that increases  the total sum of quality of
life that can be be shared among  the generations  and, in addition, shares it in a more
egalitarian way.  Briefly stated:  To prevent injustice, development  must be sustainable.
Does  efficiency  ensure  sustainability  when  each generation's  welfare  - according
to its own 'subjective'  preferences  -depends  on its own quality of life and the welfare
of the next generation? Equivalently,  do bequest motives ensure  that a perfect inter-
temporal  competitive  equilibrium  leads to sustainability? This question  is posed  in the
presence  of three different production  technologies. The results are negative for two
technologies  with heterogeneous  capital and  a  certain degree of complementarity
between  the stock  of manmade  capital and the extraction  of natural capital. Therefore,-2-
generational  conflicts will not  necessarily be solved by  a  perfect market  economy.
Thus, a requirement for sustainability is a requirement for a more fair intergenerational
distribution, it is not a simple requirement for an efficient management of natural  and
environmental resources.  By examining models having the realistic feature that capital
is heterogeneous, one can conclude that  our bequests to  future generations cannot be
viewed simply as a stock of an aggregated capital good.
If the  weight placed on the future  in each generation's 'subjective preferences'
does not ensure sustainability, then by what 'ethical preferences' (to use a term coined
by  Harsanyi) should we express our concern for the well being of future generations
beyond the subjective concen  for our own children?  In the  context of a  well known
resource model, it is argued that  the Ramsey-criterion (maximizing the undiscounted
sum  of utilities)  and  the  maximin  criterion  (maximizing the  quality  of  life of the
generation with the lowest quality of life) do not ensure both equity and development.
Building on my own work I claim that  (a) maximizing the  welfare of the  worst off
generation  (defined by  their  own  subjective preferences), and  (b)  maximizing the
welfare  of  the  present  generation  subject  to  the  constraint  that  the  resulting
development not be unjust, are much better alternatives.
It  is sometimes argued that  sustainable development cannot be realized if the
market interest rate is positive.  This claim is ill-founded.  To the contrary, it can be
argued that  if the economy follows a development that  is reasonably egalitarian, then
the market  interest rate will be positive, though there may be reasons to assume that
the interest rate is decreasing over time.
Haxtwick's  rule  characterizes  a  certain  kind  of  sustainable  development  -
namely a development where the quality of life is held constant - in a perfect market
economy with  constant  population  and  a  stationary  technology:  The  depletion of-3  -
natural capital at  any time corresponds  in  market value to  the  accumulation  of
manmade  capital. I argue,  however,  that this cannot  be turned into a prescriptive  rule:
Development  need  not be sustainable  even  when market prices  for all kinds of capital
are  available in  a  constant population, stationary technology economy and  the
accumulation  of manmade capital in market prices more than  compensates  for the
depletiun  of natural capital.  The reason why this does not hold is that the relative
price of manmade  capital in terms of natural capital in an intertemporal competitive
equilibrium  depends on the entire future equilibrium  path.  Hence, present prices
themselves  may not typically convey  the information  necessary  to determine if the
capital  and resource  management  of our generation  is sustainable.
Finally, in discussing  public policy aimed at sustainable  development,  I argue
that one should  seek  to strengthen  the mechanisms  that can be used for redistribution
from the present to the future.  If development  is not sustainable,  this is a question  of
faulty distribution,  not faulty prices.-4  -
1. DEFINITON OF SUSTAINABILITY
The notion of 'sustainable  development'  was  introduced  into the political  agenda
by the  World Commission  on  Environment and  Development  through its  report
(WCED,  1987),  also called  the Brundtland  Report. The Report does not give a precise
definition  of 'sustainable  development'. The quotation  that is usually  taken as a point
of departure is the following: "Sustainable  development  is a development  that meets
the needs  of the present  without compromising  the ability of future generations  to meet
their own needs" (WCED,  1987,  p. 43). The Brundtland  Report thus looks  at sustain-
ability both as a requirement for intragenerational  justice and as a requirement  for
intergenerational  justice. I limit the discussion  here by considering  sustainability  to be
a requirement  for intergenerational  justice;  specifically,  sustainability  requires  that our
generation not use more than our fair share of the resource base.  More precisely,
sustainability  is defined as a requirement of our generation to manage the resource base
such that the average  quality of life that we ensure ourselves  can potentially be shared by
agl  future generations.
The notion 'quality of life, includes  everything  that influences  the situation in
which people  live.  Hence,  it  includes  much more than material consumption. It  is
intended to capture the importance of health, culture, and nature.  There are two
important restrictions, though:  'Quality of life' does not include the welfare that
people  derive from their children's consumption. Likewise,  only nature's instrumental
value (i.e. recognized  value to humans) is included in the 'quality of life', not its
intrinsic value (i.e. value in its own right regardless  of human experience);  i.e., an
anthropocentric  perspective  is taken. The general  rationale behind these restrictions  is
that there is an argument to be made in favor of distinguishing  the concept  of justiceapplied  in a society  from  the forces  that are instrumental  in attaining it.  In the present
context this means that it may be desirable  to separate the definition  of sustainability
from the forces that  can motivate our generation to  act  in accordance  with the
requirement  of sustainability.
It is possible  that our generation  will  use the resource  base in a way that ensures
ourselves  a quality of life that cannot be shared by all future generations. In such a
case,  sustainability  requires  that we  reduce  the exploitation  of the resource  base today.
If the requirement  of sustainability  as defined above is not extended to later
generations,  it cannot rule out some  later generation  using  the resource  base to ensure
itself an average  quality of life that cannot be shared by its successors. It  seems,
however,  odd not to let sustainability  be a requirement  of later generations  as well. In
particular, it would be unreasonable  for our generation  to have the welfare  of distant
generations  in mind if we believed  that the intermediary  generations  would  not take
part  in an effort to  give these generations  their  fair share of the  resource base.
Extending  the requirement  of sustainability  to later generations  yields the following
definition  of sustainable  development:
Development  is sustainable  if it involves  a non-decreasing  average  quality  of life.
Furthermore,  it places  the following  requirement  on our generation:
Our  generation's  management  of the resource  base  is sustainable  if it constitutes
the first part of a feasible  sustainable  development.
This interpretation  of sustainability  has been  suggested  in a number  of references.'
I  The idea of defining  sustainability in this way dates at least back to Tietenberg
(1984)  and seems  to have been  fairly widely  accepted;  see, e.g. Repetto (1986),  Pezzey
(1989),  and Miler (1989). A critical assessment  of this interpretation  of sustainability
is given by Pearce  e  al. (1989,  pp 32 & 49).  Hammond  (1993)  gives an interesting
review  of references  relating  to the notion  of sustainability.-6-
2. A NORMATIvE  FOUNDATION  FOR SUSTAINABrLITY
In Asheim  (1991)  I argue that sustainability  in the sense  of Section  I is a natural
requirement  for intergenerational  justice.  The following  gives a brief account of this
normative  foundation  for sustainability.
Let  xt  denote the quality of life that generation  t enjoys, and call  =)  a
development  describing  how the quality of life is distributed among  the countable,  but
infinite,  number  of generations  t = 0, 1, 2,  . Say that  (x_)  is  as just  as  an
alternative development  (z;)7.o if there exists s  such that for all  a
YZS=zŽ  ST0z  ((x1 )'o  catches up with  (e)7t-  in finite time) and
(X,)@  Lorenz-dominates (n;)na  ((xt) 7.x  is as egalitarian as  (x)t=O)
Say that  the development  (z)'%=o is unjlust  if there exists an alternative feasible
development  ()>=O  such that  ('i)t=O  is as just  as  (;)>=  but  the  converse does
not hold.
Excluding  from a social  choice  developments  that are unjust amounts  to a weak
ethical restriction: It  requires a feasible  development  to be excluded if there exists
another feasible  development  that  increases  the total sum to be shared between the
generations,  and simultaneously,  shares it in a more egalitarian way.  Still, this weak
concept of justice excludes all feasible  developments  that  are not sustainable,  given
that the underlying  technology  is productive  (implying  that waiting is productive). In
fact, in a  productive technology,  a  development  is not unjust if and only if  it is
dynamically  efficient  and non-decreasing.
The central argument necessary for establishing this result is the following: If a
feasible  development (xj)70 is not non-decreasing  - i.e. there exist  s'  and  s'  with
s' < sa  such that  xn, >  x,-  then there  exists an altemative  feasible development-7-
(x)t= 0  which is identical  to  (x)z'o  except  that,  for  i= s', s%,  =  + z;J).
Furthermore,  (x,)7 0 is as just  as  (zxVi 0 but  the converse does not hold.  Hence,
given the  weak conditions imposed by  the  requirement that  the  technology be
productive, one reaches the following  conclusion:  To prevent injustice, development
must be sustainable.
3. DoEs  EFFICIENCY  ENSURE  SUSTAINABILITY?
Economic theories of natural-  and environmental resources usually seek to
answer the  following  question:  How can an efficient management o,f natural-  and
environmental resources  be achieved? The objective is to get the real economy to
imitate a perfect  market economy  through internalizing  external effects  and to promote
economic  efficiency  through regulating  the use of natural and environmental  resources
when such internalization is not feasible. Traditionally, many economists have held
the view that, in a perfect market economy,  posterity will be made better off due to
accumulation  of manmade capital (including accumulation  of knowledge).  To the
extent that  the depletion of natural resources  and the degradation of environmental
resources  have been explicitly  taklen  into account, these economists  have claimed  that,
due to rising resource  prices and technological  progress,  new reserves will be added to
existing  resources  and substitutes to these resources  will be made available. A classic
reference  for this point of view  is Barnett and Morse  (1963)  (see  also Nordhaus, 1974).
Such a view is tenable if the world economy can be described by a model which
assumes that  in addition to constant population and a stationary technology--8-
there exists one aggregate  capital  good  and that each generation  has sufficient  altruism
for the next generation. For example,  let each generation  V's  subjective  preferences  be
given  by  vS  = u(Ci)  + 6-  v +,  entailing  that the welfare  of  generation  t  (v 1)  depends  on
its own quality of life  (zx) though the utility function  u  and on the welfare  of the
next generation t + 1.  The term  subjective  preferences'  is meant to capture 'selfish'
altruism, which motivates a generation to  contribute to the welfare of its children
because it leads to increased  welfare for the contributor.  Note that  the subjective
preferences are  non-paternalistic (in  the  terminology of  Ray,  1987) since each
generation  respects the subjective  preferences  of its children, and thereby, takes into
account  the  utilities  of  all  future  generations.  Such recursion means  that
v  =  r￿  tu(z),  where  ,  (O <0<  1)  is the utility  discount factor.  In continuous
time, these subjective  preferences  can be represented  by  vt  = If7u(V)e  e'ds,  where e
(> 0)  is the utility discount rate.  Let the production  possibilities  of the technology
considered  - refenred to as technology (1) - be given by  xt + dkildt S f(k):  The stock
of the aggregate  capital good  (ks)  leads to a production  f(k)  that  can either
contribute  to the quality of life  of generation  t or be used to accumulate  capital. If the
economy  at the outset is not much developed,  so that  f'(kD) > O,  then it is a well-
known result that,  in such a  one-sector  growth model, the  capital stockl  will be
accumulated  leading to the conclusion  that posterity will be made better off.  Hence,
capital  productivity  combined with  altruism  produces a  just  intergenerational
development. Moreover,  even though our generation discounts  the utilities of future
generations,  the quality of life of these  generations  will  be higher  than ours.
However,  in general, this view cannot be defended. At any time the present
generation still  determines how the  resource base is  being managed.  Given our
technological  capacities,  it is possible  to exploit  the resource  base to our own advantage9 -
at the expense of the quality of life of future generations. That economic  efficiency
does not necessarily  lead to intergenerational  fairness was forcefully  argued by Talbot
Page (1977)  in his book Conservation  and Economic  Efficiency. He illustrated the issue
by the following  analogy: I1  someone  suggested  that the ocean fisheries  in the Pacific
should be regulated by giving  full rights to the entire resource  stock to Japan for one
year, to the United States for the next, to Russia for the third year, and so forth, it
would  be natural to claim that the country that came first would exploit the resources
to  too large an extent.  This skepticism would be especially great if  the harvest
.methods  were technologically  advanced.  Still, if we abstract  from the  fact  that
generations  overlap,  this is the way a perfect market economy  (without market failure
of any  kind)  allocates natural  and  environmental  resources between  the  generations:
Future generations' well being depends  on the altruism that we extend to them as well
4.
as our limited capacity to exploit stocks of natural and environmental  resources  to our
own advantage.
The following  model with heterogeneous  capital illustrates this.  As before, let
the subjective preferences  of each generation t be represented by  vt  = Jt7u(e  x  'ds.
However,  assume that there are two capital goods:  manmade  capital (tkmf and natural
capital (k,t).  The production F (kmt, yt)  that can either contribute to the quality of
life of generation t or be used.  to accumulate  manmade  capital depends  now both on the
stock of manmade capital and the extraction (yt) of natural capital:  x + dkmt/dt 5
F (kml,  y,).  The extraction of natural capital is counteracted  by natural renewal g(k)
that depends  on the stock of  natural capital: y; + dkA  Idt S g(k)
If there is no natural renewal  (i.e., k1t is a non-renewable  exhaustible resource)
and the production function is assumed to be given by  F (k  ,)  = kwhere
O  < b < a < a + b < 1,  the model  investigated  by Dasgupta  and Heal (1974, 1979)  and-10-
Solow  (1974)  is obtained. In this model  - which  will be referred  to as technology  (2) -
a positive and non-decreasing  development  for  x,  is feasible  by letting-the ine casing
stock of manmade capital substitute for the dwindling  extraction of natural capital.
However,  the marginal  productivity  of manmade  capital will approach  zero along  such
a path.-  This means that  sustainability will be achieved only with an  increasing
altruism for future generations.  In particular, with a positive and constant utility
discount rate  p,  xt  will asymptotically  approach  zero.  This variant of the model
thereby shows that even if we put almost as much weight on the utility of future
generations as  on our own, a  perfect market economy  will not  necessarily  ensure
sustainability.
Another variant of the model is obtained by assuming  a regenerative  capacity
for natural capital, e.g.  g(k)  = k t(i - k  and by assuming  that the extraction of
natural capital is limited by the extractive capacity (cf(kmi)) that  is established:
F  (kt  Yt)  = min{cf(kmi),  yt}.  This model will be referred to  as technology (3).  In
such a model  it can be shown  (see  Asheim,  1978,  and Hannesson,  1986)  that, with small
altruism for posterity (large  e) and a low level  technology  (low c), development  will be
sustainable  if the economy  at the outset is not yet highly  developed (k.0 is small  such
that  cf'(kmo) > p).  This is because  the extraction l T  natural capital even in the long
run (as  cf'(kM 1)  - g) does not exceed the maximal level of natural renewal- The
stock of  natural capital is not  reduced to  a  level that  is  smaller than  the  one
corresponding  to the maximal  level of natural renewal. This implies that the natural
capital does not attain a positive  (shadow)  price in the intertemporal  equilibrium.  The
model  therefore  shares the properties  of technology  (1), the one-sector  model that was
described  above. On the other hand, if the altruism for  posterity is great (small a) and
the technological  level is high (high c), development  will not be sustainable if theecononmy  at  the outset  is not yct highly developed.  The extraction of natural  capital
and the quality of life will exceed the maximum sustainable level.  In the intertemporal
equilibrium the natural  capital will attain  a positive (shadow) price, and the  natural
renewal rate will in  the long run approach the  utility  discount rate  (g'(kCm  ),
implying that  the stock of natural capital is reduced to a level that is smaller that  the
one corresponding to the maximal level of natural  renewal.  It  is a paradoxical result
that  in  this  version of  the  model, a  greaLer concern  for posterity  and  a  higher
technological level may lead production for some time to exceed the ma-ximum  level of
natural renewal and thus, eventually, result in posterity being made worse off.  Thcse
results are, of course, dependent on the shape of the natural renewval  function.
These two versions of the model with heterogeneous capital - technologies (2)
and (3) - have  the following  property in common:  The stock of manmade capital is
to  a certain degree complementary to  the extraction  of natural  capital.  In the  first
version (technology (2)), the marginal productivity of manmade capital  is positively
related to  the  extraction  of natural  capital.  In  the other  version (technology (3)),
complementarity is more extreme: Manmade capital can only be used for extracting
natural  capital.  With  such extreme complementarity, the accumulation of manma(le
capital is a mixed blessing. In Richard Norgaard's (1991) analogy; if the livelihood  of a
society depends on the  harvesting of a forest, f-ature  generations can gain more if the
current generation invests by planting trees rather than accumulating saws.
On this basis the following  conclusions  can be drawn:
(1)  Generational  conflicts will  not  necessarily be  solved  in  a  perfect  market
economv.  Distributional problems arise because the present generation through
its  capital  and  resource management policy; determines the  wealth  of future
generations.-12  -
(2)  A  requirement for  sustainability is  a  requirement for  a  more fair  inter-
generational  distribution. It is not a requirement  for an efficient  management  of
natural and environmental  resources. Page's (1917)  analogy  of a sailing  ship -
where sustainabiliLy  corresponds to  setting  the  rudder  according to  the
destination and efficiency  corresponds  to balancing  the sails according  to the
wind - provides, however,  the following  observation: How the rudder is set
influences  how the sails will  have to be balanced.
(3)  Our  bequests to  future generations  cannot be looked at  as  a  stock of  an
aggregated  capital good. The present  generation  may not act in the interest of
future generations  by leaving behind a large stock of capital that can only be
used  to  extract  natural  resources or  that  leads to  the  degradation of
environmental  resources  through  its use.
4. ETHICAL  PREFERENCES:  CRITERIA  FOR  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOPMENT
Our altruism may not ensure  sustainability  even in a perfect market economy.
However,  our descendants  will depend  on our altruism in any case as the altruism of
the  present  generation actually  determines whether natural  and  environmental
resources  are managed today in a manner compatible  with sustainable development.
As a thought experiment  it can still be interesting  to ask the following  question: How
should  we express our concern for the well being of future generations  beyond the
subjective  concern  for our own children? In the words  of Harsanyi  (1955),  what ethical
preferences  should  we have? What kind of criterion  for intergenerational  justice would
we recomnmend  if we did not know to what generation we belonged  and considered-13-
intergenerational distribution from an anonymous perspective?  By ethical preferences
we here mean preferences  which are "costly" for the generations to abide by, and which
as a consequence  will not be accepted unless they are imposed as a moral obligation,
distinguishing ethical  preferences from the 'selfish'  altruism  captured  by  subjective
preferences
In the model of Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974)  - technology (2)
above, with heterogeneous capital, but without natural  renewal - the altruism of the
subjective preferences is not sufficient to ensure an ethically acceptable management of
the productive resources of the economy. As long as generations discount the welfare of
thcir children with a positive rate  (no  matter how small this is), the quality  of life of
distant generations will be forced to  approach zero.  The economy may grow within a
short and intermediate time frame, but sustainable development will not be ensured in
spite of the explicit assumption that  such development is feasible.  The reason is that
the  capital  productivity  of the  economy approaches zero as  an  increasing stock of
reproducible capital substitutes  for a dwindling resource extraction.  The altruism of
the subjective preferences is, hence, not sufficient to  ensure  a just  intergenerational
distribution (not even a zero discount rate will help as argued in the next paragraph).
Thus, if intergenerational justice is to be imposed, we need to act in compliance with
ethical preferences.
What  ethical  preferences should be  used  in  this  specific technology?  One
possibility is to require that  generations do not discount the welfare of their  children,
so that the present generation  0  is required to choose the path of quality of life which
makes  I  u(zl)dt  "as large  as  possible" when  s -fr  oo.  This  corresponds to  the
Ramsey-criterion (Ramsey, 1928).  In the resource model above this  leads to  a path
where the quality of life increases above all finite bounds, as shown by Dasgupta and14  -
Heal  (1979,  pp.  303-308).  Instead  of  having  their  existence  threatened,  future
generations  become  incredibly  well off.  Apart  from  stretching  the  technological
assumptions of the  model, this  appears  to go too far in favor of future  generations:
Why should we save for the benefit of descendants infinitely beLter off than ourselves?
A very  different alternative  is to maximize the quality  of life of the generation
with  the lowest quality of life, i,e.,  max inJf, 0r,.  As shown by Solow (197-4),  such a
maximin-criterion  leads  to  a  constant  level of  quality  of  life, thereby  producing  a
development that is both sustainable and egalitarian.  The quality of life corresponding
to such an egalitarian path can be viewed as the maximal level that  is compatible with
the  notion  of  having  our  quality  of  life  being  potentially  shared  by  all  future
generations; i.e,  the maximal level that  is compatible with sustainable  development.
Still counter arguments can be raised:  (a) If the economy is poor at the outset  (i.e. has
a small stock of manmade capital), it  becomes locked into poverty.  The productive
resources of the  economy are managed in  a sustainable way, but  deveiopment is not
created.  (b) If generations actually care about their children, why should they not be
allowed to save on their behalf?
A  third  alternative,  which includes the  two alternatives  mentioned above as
special cases, is the  following ethical preferences:  Respect that  the  welfare of each
generation  is  given  by  its  subjective  preferences and  hence,  in  its  discrete-time
representation, depends on its own quality of life and the welfare of its children.  Then
maximize the  welfare of the generation that  according to  its subjective preferences is
worst off:  mar in4f0v - As [ show in Asheim (1988), this leads to a growing quality of
life initially when the  economy is highly productive.  The initial phase is eventually
followed by  a  phase  with  constant  quality  of life, thereby  ensuring  the  welfare of
distant  generations.  The possibilities for development are not  wasted, while at  the-1.5-
same timc the productive rcsources of thc economy are being managed in a sustainable
manner.  This  alternative  includes the Ramsey-criterion and the ma-ximin-criterion as
special cases since (i) if each generation on the basis of its subjective preferences does
not  discount  the  welfare  of  its  children 1 then  the  ethical  preferences  are  of  no
importance and we returni to the Ramsey-criterion, while on the other hand (ii) if every
generation discounts the welfare of its children heavily, then the ethical criterion  forces
a completely egalitarian path and no development occurs.
A fourth alternative  is based on the normative foundation provided in Section 2,
and is the  one that  I e-xplore  in Asheim (1991):  Maximize the  wvelfare  of the present
generation 0 in accordance wvith  its subjective preferences subject to the constraint  that
the resulting intergenerational  development not be unjust  Since the technology con-
sidered (technology (2), with  heteroogeneous  capital  and  without  natural  renewal)  is
productive  in  the  sense of  Section 2,  it  follows that  these  ethical  preferences  are
equivalent to the present generation 0 maximizing its welfare subject to the constraint
that  the quality  of life be non-decreasing.  This, in  turn, implies that  the development
is exactly the  same as  the  one obtained  in  alternative  3  above.  Hence, in  Asheim
(1988, 1991) 1 present  two  alternative  ethical  preferences which  in  a  discrete-time
version of the  model of Dasgupta and Heal (1974, 1979) and Solow (1974) give rise to
the same outcome.
In both  the  third  and  the fourth  alternatives,  welfare is maximized subject to
the  constraint  that  the  quality  of life be non-decreasing.  In  Asheim (1988, proof of
Lemma 4), the properties of such a path are spelled out.  The interest rate turns  out to
be positive, decreasing, and  asymptotically approaching zero.  The  implicit  discount
rate  is equal to the discount rate of the subjective preferences as long as the  quality of
life is increasing.  It jumps  up just  as  the constraint  that  the  path  be non-decreasing-16-
starts to bind.  From then on, the implicit discount rate is equal to the interest rate
and  follows its  decrease towards zero.  If  the  discount rates  employed by  the
generations  when  maximizing  the discounted  sum of future utilities were to follow  this
path, the development  path of the third and the fourth alternatives could have been
realized  as an intertemporal  competitive  equilibrium.
5. CHARACTER[ZATION,  RULES AND POLICIES
Can economic theory help to  understand  and analyze the concept  'sustainable
development'? I concentrate  on three questions:
1.  Characterization of sustainable development-  (How to describe the  situation if
we are heading for the right destination?)
2.  Prescriptive  rules  for sustainable  development.  (How to  detect  if we are off
course?)
3.  Policies for sustainable  development.  (If  necessary, what  should and  can  be
done to change the course?)
I will answer these questions in turn.
5.1  Characterization of  sustainable development.  Human economic activity
leads  to  the  depletion  of  natural  resources and  the  degradation  of  environmental
resources.  Sustainable  development requires that  manmade  capital  (both  real  and
human) be accumulated in order to mak-e  up for the decreased availability of natural
capital.-  This  leads to  the  following observations:  (a) The present generation  must
leave behind a  bequest of  manmade  and  natural  capital  that  will benefit  all  later
generations.  Such a transfer is facilitated if there is a technology available that allows-17-
for accumulation of manmade capital without leading to future depletion and degrada-
tion of natural  capital.  I will refer to such a technology as a 'sustainablel  technology.
(b)  An  economy that  develops in  a  sustainable  way  is  in  continuous  change.  In
particular,  the economy will not follow a stationary path even in the case with constant
population  and  a  stationary  technology.  These  observations  can  be  used  to
characterize the mark-et  interest rate along developments that are sustainable.
It  may  seem  reasonable  to  claim  that  sustainable  development  cannot  be
realized if the  market  interest  rate  is  positive.  I  argue  the  contrarv.  Sustainable
development cannot be characterized by the mark-et  interest rate equal to zero for all t.
If the interest  rate is equal to zero for all  , then the  present value of an annuity  - a
bequest that  pays one unit in each period - is infinite.  This implies that  there  are no
non-accepted investment  projects yielding an  annuity  of benefits.  If optimistic,  one
would claim that  such projects exist.  That  the present value of an annuity  is infinite
then  means that  all  such projects  are  accepted  along the  sustainable  development-
This in turn is likely to imply that the present generation due to high investment costs,
is left with a low quality of life.  If pessimistic, one would claim that  such projects do
not exist.  This  means that  the  present generation cannot  provide fuiture generations
with  a  bequest that  pays  one unit  in each  period.  Thus,  it  becomes impossible to
compensate - through accumulation of manmade caDital - for the harm caused by our
depletion of natural  resources and  our degradation of environmental  resources.  This
undermines the  possibilities for achieving sustainability.  Therefore, if  the  economy
follows a sustainable development that  is reasonablv egalitarian,  then there  exist non-
accepted investment projects that  produce an annuity of benefits.  This  in turn  implies
that  the  market  interest  rate  is positive  and  does  not  decrease  too  fast.  These
arguments are supported by formal growth-theoretic models, such as technology (2) of-18-
Section 3 with heterogeneous capital and without natural  renewal (analyzed by Solow,
1974, and Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, 1979).
On the  other  hand,  this  resull  does not  say anything about  the  level of the
interest rate.  It also says little about the development of the interest rate except that
the market  value of a benefit or a  cost of indefinite duration must be finite.  Since a
sustainable economy is in continuous change, there  is no basis for assuming that  the
market interest rate is constant.  On the contrary, it may be reasonable to assume that
the interest  rate  is decreasing over time since the marginal productivity of manmade
capital  decreases as  the  stocks of such capital  are  accumulated and stocks and  the
extraction of natural  capital gradually vanish.  This property can also be illustrated by
technology  (2)  of  Section  3.  Note  that  a  decreasing interest  rate  increases  the
profitability of investments based on a 'sustainable technology'.
Hartwick's  (1977) rule (see also Dixit,  Hammond, and  Hoel, 1980) is a  wvell
known characterization result for a sustainable development of a certain kind, nameCv  a
development where the  quality  of life is held constant.  The rule assumes constant
population and a stationary technology and gives the fnllowing  characterization:  If, in
a  perfect market  economy, the  quality  of life is held constant  indefinitely-,  then  the
depletion  of  natural  capital  at  any  time  corresponds  in  market  value  to  the
accumulation of manmade capital; i.e., the market  value of net investments is equal to
zero.  Note that  Hartwick's rule does not imply that  the  total  value of the  capital
stocks is constant along a path where the quality of life is held constant.  This wo-uld  be
the case under the assumption of a constant interest rate.  However, a constant quality
of life and a constant interest rate  may be inconsistent in the sense that  they cannot
both be realized.  If the interest rate is decreasing, the capital gains will be positive.  In
this  case, a  constant  quality  of life corresponds to  an increasing total  value of the-19  -
capital stocks.  In Asheim (1993b)  I have explored the relation between capital gains
and the interest rate along  an egalitarian  path.
5.2  Rules for sustainable  development. In order to derive rules for sustainable
development,  it is necessary  to operationalize  the notion of income  presented by Hicks
(1946)  in his book Value and Capital: What is the maximum that a population of an
economy  can consume  in a given period and still be as well off at the end of the period
as it was in the beginning? In an economy  with constant population and a stationary
technology,  this question can easily be answered  if there is only one aggregate capital
good: The quality of life does  not exceed  the sustainable level if and only if the stock of
the aggregate  capital good is not reduced. It is, however,  a complicated  task to answer
this question  in an economy  with heterogeneous  capital.  The reason is that, if human
economic  activity depletes the stocks of natural capital, it is necessary  to determine
how much accumulation  of manmade  capital is required to make up for the depletion.
How can relative prices  be found  that 'correctly'  value the different  kinds of capital? It
is a  natural point of departure to investigate whether market prices - under the
assumption of a perfect market economy  with constant population and a stationary
technology  - can be used to determine  the 'correct' relative price between natural and
manmade capital:  Does it hold - as claimed by eg.  M3ler (1991,  p.  11) and Huflten
(1992, p. 17) (see also Solow, 1993)  - that  the quality of life does not exceed the
maximum  sustainable level if and only if the market value of net investments is non-
negative,  i.e., if the accumulation  of manmade capital at least compensates  in market
value for the  depletion of natural capital?  The analyses of Hartwick (1977) and
Weitzman (1976)  appear to lay two alternative  foundations  for this view.
Foundation A.  Hartwick's (1977)  rule states that  'the market value of net in-
vestments being equal to zero for all t  is equivalent to  '(x)  =o being constant'.  In the-20-
context of a competitive  economy,  Hartwick's  rule states that an intertemporal  compe-
titive equilibrium  leads to a completely  egalitarian  path if and only if, at all times,  the
value of depleted natural capital measured  at competitive  prices equals the reinvest-
ment in manmade  capital. However  Hartwick's  rule does not claim that a competitive
economy  that for the moment  measured  at competitive  prices  reinvests  depleted  natural
capital in manmade  capital manages its stocks for natural and manmade  capital in a
sustainable manner.  For it is conceivable  that such reinvestment  is achieved  because
the competitive  prices  of natural capital are low.  This in turn can be caused by the
economy  not being managed  in a sustainable  manner: If future generations  are poorer
than we are, they will  be unable  to "bid" highly  through  the intertemporal  competitive
equilibrium  for the depletable  natural capital we manage,  leading  to low prices  of such
capital today.  Although Hartwick's rule implies that  the  market value of  net
investments is equal to zero at any time t if the economy  follows  an efficient  and
egalitarian path, one cannot conclude  that if the market value of net investments at
some time t is equal  to zero, then the quality of life at time t is sustainable. The reason
why this does not hold is the relative price of manmade  capital in terms of natural
capital in  an  intertemporal competitive equilibrium depends on the  entire future
equilibrium  path.
Foundation B.  Weitzman (1976) shows that if the development  (X')'=  iS
realized  as an equilibrium  in a perfect  market economy  with a constant market interest
rate r, then it holds  - under the assumption  that quality of life could be 'moved'  along
the time axis with a rate of return equal to  r - that  r,  plus the market value of net
investments  at time t would  have been sustainable. In particular, if the market value
of net investments at time t is non-negative,  then  x  would have been sustainable
under the above assumption.  The problem with this line of reasoning  is that  the-21-
interest cannot be taken to be constant (which the Weitzman analysis requires) and
will  not remain unchanged  when  quality of life  is moved along  the time axis.
In  Asheim (1993a) I have shown - within the context of technology (2) of
Section  3 - that the market value of net investments  can be positive while at the same
time  exceeds  the maximum  sustainable level. This proves  formally that neither A
nor B can be used as a foundation for the view that  xt  is sustainable if the market
value of net investments at a given time t is non-negative. In particular, it means that
Hartwick's (1977) rule is a characterization result, not a prescriptive rule for sustainable
development
In practical applications, a host of different problems complicates  the task of
determining  whether the quality of life of the present generation is sustainable. (a)  If
the population is growing,  it is correct to require that  the per capita capital stock be
non-decreasing  only if the relative population growth is constant - even under the
assumption  that an aggregate  capital good exists. If e.g. the present generation is half
as large as all future generations (i.e. constant population beginning with the  next
generation), then it is unreasonable  to require that the present generation accumulate
the stock of the aggregate  capital stock to a size twice as large as the one it inherited,
when  such a requirement  is not extended  to the later generations. (b)  The assumption
that  the technology is stationary means that  technological  progress is endogenous:
Capital components  measuring  accumulated  knowledge  may be included in the produc-
tion  function.  Exogenous technological progress - meaning that  the  production
function  changes  over time - is not allowed. How restrictive this assumption is, relates
closely  to the next point, namely that (c) not all capital stocks can be valued  given the
available  price information. This applies  not only to accumulated  knowledge,  but also
to stocks of natural and environmental  capital.  A final problem is related to the fact-22-
that  (d) our  capital and  resource management does not  have deterministic conse-
quences. All these problems are related to the discussion  on how to measure a green
national product.
The analysis above holds both for an open (national) and a  closed (global)
economy.  However, particular  problems arise when trying  to  prescribe rules for
sustainability in an open economy: The technology  must then include the gains from
trade (see Svensson,  1986). This means that the assumption  of a stationary technology
would necessitate that  the relative international prices are constant.  However,  from
Hotelling's  (1931)  rule, it follows  that from a resource-rich  country's point of view, the
terms-of-trade  facing future generations  will be more favorable  than the one facing the
present generation.  This implies that  a part of the capital gains on the unexploited
stocks of natural resources can be considered  as income in the sense  of  Hicks (1946),
thus lowering  the required compensating  investments (see  Asheim,  1986,  1993b).
5.3  Policies for sustainable development.  If a perfect market  economy does not
give rise to sustainable development,  should  one then recommend  that the government
reduce the rate of discount used when  evaluating  public investment projects  and inter-
vening in the  management of natural and environmental resources?  In  principle,
economists claim  that  distributional  policies should  not  be  executed  through
administrative price manipulation by the government. In this case, this corresponds
to:  Do not let the discount rate of the public sector be an instrument in the transfer of
wealth to  future  generations, since this  leads to  lower rates  of  return  on  public
investment projects and inefficiencies  (since different types of capital investments are
being evaluated in different ways). The discount rate of the public sector (which in a
perfect market economy equals the  market interest  rate)  reflects, but  is  not  an
instrument for, the policies  aimed at a redistribution between  generations.-23-
Even if it were possible for the public sector to  contribute  to  a  lower market
interest rate  in general - such that  the profitability of investments were calculated on
the basis of this lower market  interest rate  (and we abstract  from the  disequilibrium
that  would arise if voluntary savings would not be sufficient to finance investments) -
this  lower market  interest  rate  would not necessarily be a good instrument  for the
attainment  of sustainable development.  It  would remove the  inefficiency that  arises
when different types of capital are evaluated in different ways.  The problem is that  a
lower market interest rate  may encourage investments in manmade capital with long-
run negative natural  and environmental effects.  This point,  illustrated  in technology
(3) of Section 3 - the model with heterogeneous capital, positive natural  renewal, and
an extreme complementarity between the stock of manmade capital and extraction  of
natural capital, is related to the argument made in the 1960's, namely that  the interest
rate ought to be "high" for natural resonrce protection.
If  the  distributional goals of a  society are  not  reached in  a  perfect  market
economy, one should seek directly to redistribute wealth in favor of future generations,
e.g. through conservation of renewable resources in  a productive state  and increased
investment in manmade capital based on a 'sustainable technology'.  Following such a
redistribution,  the  resulting  development may  be  characterized  by  a  lower  and
decreasing market  interest rate.  If this lower and  decreasing market  interest  rate  is
being  used as  discount  rate,  then  renewable resources will to  a  greater  extent  be
conserved in  a  productive  state,  investment  projects leading  to  long-run negative
natural  and environmental effects will become less profitable, and investment projects
based on a 'sustainable techmology'  will become more profitable.
If manipulation of discount or interest rates is not a good public instrument, we
are  faced  with  the  following  problem:  What  instruments  are  available  for-24-
distributional  policies between generations?  (1)  It  will of  course contribute to
sustainable development  to reduce through internalization  the over-use  of natural and
environmental  resources  that is the result of negative  external effects. This also entails
including negative environmental  effects in benefit/cost analyses. However,  as I have
emphasized above,  such  internalization is  not  sufficient to  ensure  sustainable
development.  (2) Information regarding the long-term consequences  of the present
development can also contribute to sustainability:  Perhaps the  future will not be
better off; on the contrary, their quality of life  may be lower than ours if the depletion
of natural resources  and degradation  of environmental  resources  are taken into account.
Such information may reduce  complacency. (3) Since  altruism for future generations  is
a major force in order to implement sustainability, it  is important to reinforce the
bequest motive.  To strengthen  the degree  to which nature's intrins:c value is captured
by preferences  of humans, may also be helpful.  It  is, however, unclear how public
policy can contribute to this.  (4) The public sector can contribute to increased  public
saving.  Such a  policy may, however, be fully or  partially neutralized through a
corresponding  decreased  private saving (see Barro, 1974). (5) The public sector can,
possibly  through international cooperation,  contribute to the conservation  of renewable
resources in  a  productive state.  An  international agreement seeling  to  reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases is an  example of this.  Encouraging development  of
'sustainable technology'  may also potentially be of great importance.-25  -
6. CONCLUSIONS
Sustainable development  is concerned  with distributional issues- The question
of intergenerational  distribution is not necessarily solved through the attainment of
economic  efficiency. Internalization of external effects is therefore not sufficient to
ensure  sustainability.
A positive  market interest rate is not inconsistent  with sustainable development.
On the contrary, it can be argued that if the economy  follows  a development  that is
reasonably  egalitarian, then the market interest rate will be positive.  For some types
of economies;  there are reasons  to assume that the interest rate is decreasing  over time.
Present prices may not convey  the information  necessaxy  to determine whether
development  is sustainable. Development  need not be sustainable  even if market pnrces
for a0l kinds of capital are available and the  accumulation  of manmade capital in
market prices  more than compensates  for the depletion  of natural capital.
Finally,  public  policy aimed  at  sustainable development should  seek  to
strengthen  the mechanisms  that can be used for redistribution  from the present to the
future.  If development  is not sustainable,  this is a question  of faulty distribution, not
faulty prices.-26-
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